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I. Introduction 
The participation of interest groups in public policy making is unavoidable.  No society 
can be so repressive nor individual power be so extreme that decisions are undertaken by 
a narrow clique of individuals without consideration to others.  Its unavoidable nature is 
only matched by the universal suspicion with which it has been seen by both policy 
makers and the public.  Recently, however, there has been a growing literature that 
examines the participation of interest groups in public policy making from a New 
Institutional Economics perspective.  The distinguishing feature of the New Institutional 
Economics Approach, as it is understood today, is its emphasis in opening up the black 
box of decision-making, whether in understanding the rules of the game, or the play of 
the game.  Indeed, as Oliver Williamson says,  
“The NIE has progressed not by advancing an overarching theory but by 
uncovering and explicating the microanalytic features [of institutions] to 
which Arrow refers and by piling block upon block until the cumulative 
value added cannot be denied.”
1 
Thus, in this paper we do not attempt to fairly describe the vast literature on interest 
group’s behavior.  Instead, we mostly review recent papers that follow Williamson’s NIE 
mantra.  That is, they attempt to explicate the micro-analytic features of the way interest 
groups actually interact with policy-makers, rather than providing an abstract high-level 
representation.
2   
                                                 
1 See Williamson (2000). 
2 An earlier wave of new institutional analysis of interest groups was led by Mancur Olson’s path breaking 
1971 The Logic of Collective Action.  His analysis of the organization of, and individual incentives to join 
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We start this survey by emphasizing that to understand the role of interest groups 
in the modern administrative state, it is fundamental to recognize that while legislatures 
enact statutes, and often supervise their implementation, it is bureaucracies that, via the 
administrative process, make and implement the bulk of policies.  Consider, for example, 
telecommunications in the United States.  For more than 60 years the main body of 
telecommunications legislation in the United States was the Federal Communications Act 
(FCA) of 1934.
3  This piece of legislation specifically directed the newly created Federal 
Communications Commission to regulate interstate communications so as to provide 
telecommunications services at “just, fair and reasonable prices.”  Nowhere in the Act 
were there specific instructions about how to obtain that general goal.  Furthermore, the 
Act presumed the existence of a monopoly supplier of long distance services.  The 
fostering of competition was not one of the stated goals of the Act.  Even though the FCA 
was silent about competition, from the late 1950s until the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, the FCC was engaged in a process of partially deregulating the long distance and 
the customer provided equipment segments of the industry, which culminated with the 
passing of the 1996 Telecommunications Act.  This process was partially triggered by 
various interest group actions, which included introduction of multiple pieces of 
legislation, continuous lobbying of congress and the agency, and, naturally, suing for 
policy changes in courts.
4   
                                                                                                                                                 
groups, led to a large literature on the formation and organization of interest groups.  See, for example, 
Moe (1980) and references therein. 
3 47 U.S.C. 151 (1934).  
4 For a more detailed analysis of the role played by interest groups in the opening of the 
telecommunications market in the US, see Spiller (1996b). 
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Indeed, the potentially large distributional effects of legislation provide the 
affected groups strong incentives to attempt to control what policies are made and how 
they are enforced.  Thus, much of interest group action in the modern administrative state 
is geared toward influencing the implementation of, often vague, policies.  
In this paper we first discuss the role of interest groups in the policy making process, 
and then explore how it is affected by the nature of the institutional environments in 
which interest groups operate. 
II.  Buy, Lobby or Sue 
The literature normally relates to the activities of interest groups generically as 
“lobbying,” where by this it refers to actions such as transferring resources to policy 
makers (whether in the form of a campaign contribution, or bribes) or transferring 
information.  These two, however, are drastically different actions, and in this survey we 
will not follow the usual definition of lobbying as the quintessential interest group 
activity.  Instead we look at three main ways by which interest groups may sway policy 
outcomes their preferred way: buying influence, lobbying for influence, and suing.   
Buying influence reflects the actions, often legal and sometimes illegal, by which interest 
groups may attempt to get decision makers (whether politicians or bureaucrats) to listen 
to their needs, and, hopefully, act accordingly.  Lobbying for influence consists of the 
various actions, also often legal, and sometimes illegal, by which interest groups attempt 
to transfer information to politicians and bureaucrats about issues (such as voters’ 
preferences, impact of particular agency or legislative proposals, etc) that may affect 
decision makers’ political and bureaucratic calculus. Suing is the art of using the judicial 
process to change the arena where the game is played, away from the legislative and 
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administrative process, towards the court.  Judicial action may be pursued against a 
particular policy or its implementation, depending, naturally, of the nature of the case, but 
also of the more general environment in which the interest group operates.
5   
II.1  Direct and Indirect Influence 
Buying, lobbying and suing can also be direct or indirect.  Interest groups pursue a direct 
action (say lobbying) when the target is intended to act directly on the matter.  For 
example, an interest group may lobby a legislator with the specific intent of changing her 
vote on a particular bill; or may lobby the legislator with the intent that the legislator use 
the information to exert their authority to influence the way a particular agency 
implements a statute. The same direct/indirect dichotomy applies to the other two 
strategic choices.
6     
II.2  Buying 
Legislator-buying is the most publicized form of interest group influence, and the one 
that has attracted the most attention by scholars and pundits alike.
 7 
                                                 
5 Some countries do not provide for a blanket declaration of lack of constitutionality of a statute, requiring 
instead its prior application (i.e., an agency decision) to a particular case.   
6 The analogy to “buying” is straightforward. The analogy to suing requires a bit more explanation.  The 
purpose of suing is to shift the arena of the game away from the legislative/bureaucratic arena, towards the 
judicial arena, where the interest group expects to get via litigation what it was unable to obtain via the 
other strategies.  The purpose of litigation, at the same time, may be direct – such as reversing an adverse 
bureaucratic outcome, or indirect, such as putting the regulatory agency on notice that pursuing this 
particular policy line would be extremely expensive.  One can understand in this way the strategy of those 
entrants, such as MCI and others, who fought the FCC to open the telecommunications market.  Indeed, 
Temin (1987) points to MCI’s multiple law suits against the FCC as the triggering factor that increased the 
hostility of the Justice Department against AT&T, and helped motivate it to pursue AT&T’s eventual 
break-up.   
7 Even US President Theodore Roosevelt saw the need in 1906 to coin the term “muckrakers” to refer to 
those journalists who questioned the influence of business in policy making.  See The Columbia 
Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition, 2001-05, available at http://www.bartleby.com/65/mu/muckrake.html. 
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II.2.1 Buying Direct Influence  
The classical interest group literature focuses on direct vote buying.  Scholars model this 
interaction as a game where interest groups compete with each other to capture legislators 
by making contributions (to campaigns, or illegally, for profit) in return for politicians’ 
votes.
8  Empirical evidence on the pay-for-vote interaction between interest groups and 
legislators is at best inconclusive.  Stramann (1998) studies time pattern in PAC 
contributions and finds that changes in PAC contributions are correlated with the voting 
schedule on relevant policies, independent of the electoral cycle.  The extent to which 
direct vote buying by interest groups actually takes place, however, is unclear.  Indeed, 
more than thirty years ago, Gordon Tullock asked the fundamental question of why there 
is so little money going to US policy makers (1972).  Ansolabehere, DeFigueiredo and 
Snyder (2003), investigating the size and makeup of political contributions, and their 
effect on politicians’ behavior, find that, conditioned on the effect of policies on interest 
groups’ welfare, these groups give far less than they should, and furthermore, that 
contributions have little effect on politicians’ behavior.
9  Alternatively, contributions 
could be made as a source of ideological consumption,
10 or simply tickets to obtain 
access.  Indeed, Ansolabehere, Snyder and Tripathi (1995) find a strong connection 
between buying (campaign contributions) and lobbying, suggesting that campaign 
contributions may indeed be used to gain and maintain access.  Bronas and Lott, Jr. 
                                                 
8 Among the classical buying legislators’ papers, see Denzau and Munger (1986); Snyder (1990), (1991); 
Baron (1994). 
9 One could argue that legislators (and the president) buy each others’ votes via pork-barrel legislation.  
Although the practice is well studied (for a recent application to Brazil, see Alston and Mueller 2006), I 
will not deal with this issue here. 
10 Since the probability that a small contribution will impact on the probability of the legislator’s reelection 
is small, the net gains from the contribution could well be negative. 
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(1997) reach a similar conclusion.  They find that politicians in their last term do not alter 
their voting behavior significantly compared to their preceding term, indicating that 
interest groups contribute to politicians who are more aligned with their political views, 
rather than buying votes, a view consistent with campaign contributions being more a 
consumption than an investment activity.
11  
II.2.2 Buying Indirect Influence  
Following the direct implications of the Congressional Dominance Hypothesis,
12 or of the 
Separation of Powers Hypothesis on judicial decision-making,
13 interest groups can also 
attempt to control policy outcomes through buying legislators’ influence on bureaucrats 
or courts.  The Congressional Dominance Hypothesis, which presents in a different form 
the “fire alarm” framework of McCubbins and Schwartz (1984), suggests that 
independent agencies are not truly independent, as they are subject to continual - 
although not necessarily active - congressional oversight.  Active congressional reversal, 
though, is not necessary, all that is needed is the credible threat of legislative action.  
Spiller (1992) shows that the discretion of independent administrative agencies in a 
system of division of powers depends, among other things, on the composition of the 
legislature and the executive (determining the threat of congressional reversal).
14 In a 
system of division of powers, however, full Congressional Dominance is a corner 
                                                 
11 One could always spin a reciprocity theory whereby interest groups may compensate legislators with post 
legislative employment, increasing thus the potential for interest alignment even on legislators’ last terms.  
For a recent survey of theories of capture by interest groups, see Dal Bó (2006). 
12 See, for example, Weingast and Moran (1983), McCubbins and Schwartz (1984), and references therein.  
The evidence on legislators’ influence on agency actions is large.  I focus here on the incentives for buying 
legislators so as to achieve such influence. 
13 See, for example, Gely and Spiller (1990), Spiller and Gely (1992), Ferejohn and Shipan (1990).  For a 
critique and response see Segal (1998) and Bergara, Richman and Spiller (2003). 
14 The organization and budget of the judiciary (determining the threat of judicial reversal) is also of 
relevance (Spiller 1992).   
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solution and requires a particular type of political composition between the legislature 
and the executive.
15  Thus, in political environments with divided governments, agencies 
do not always, nor fully, respond to Congressional desires.  As a result, buying indirect 
influence is not always an efficient or effective strategy for interest groups. 
There is some recent evidence of buying indirect influence.  De Figueiredo and 
Edwards (2004) find that state regulatory commissions’ decisions on telecommunications 
policy (in particular, interconnection charges) are closely aligned with campaign 
contributions to key legislators by both incumbents and new entrants.  Indirect buying 
provides then, a third explanation to the scant evidence concerning the link between 
campaign contributions and observable policy outcomes.   
II.3  Lobbying 
An alternative way for interest groups to exert influence is to provide legislators with 
valuable information.  The purpose of this information is to potentially alter legislators’ 
support for a particular policy.
16  We call the transfer of information lobbying.
17  Interest 
groups may transfer information to legislators and other decision makers in various ways.  
Interest groups may, for example, participate in hearings, may directly provide 
background documentation, or organize protests.  To be of value, these costly actions 
must transfer relevant information to decision makers, whether legislators, bureaucrats or 
judges.  The information may concern the value, cost and distributional implication of a 
                                                 
15 Spiller (1990) shows that Congressional budgetary decisions for agencies reflect an internal rather than a 
corner solution.   
16 Support may depend on the legislator’s perception of his/her constituency’s preferences over the policy, 
or of his/her own believes about the public good. 
17 In principle, conditional campaign or in general monetary contributions may also change legislators’ 
perspectives about particular policies.  I focus here, though, on information concerning states of the world, 
rather than on interest group actions. 
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particular policy to the legislators’ constituents, the saliency of the issue to the interest 
group’s constituency, or the implication of alternative technologies or policy 
implementation.
 18  The information transfer can be done following formal (and legal) 
procedures,
19 or via informal (and often illegal) ways.
20  All these transfer information to 
the relevant actor.  As influence buying, lobbying for influence may be direct or indirect.   
II.3.1 Lobbying for Direct Influence  
An interest group providing information about the consequences of a particular bill is 
attempting to get legislators to take that information into account when voting for a 
particular bill.  Scholars in recent years have given much attention to the informal and 
formal rules by which interest groups engage in information lobbying.  The formal 
literature in general does not discriminate between direct and indirect lobbying.  A key 
issue in lobbying, though, is the inherent bias in the information transmission process.  
Interest groups will only provide information when it is in their advantage to do so.  
Calvert (1985) shows,
21 however, that even biased information may be preferred to no 
information.  Furthermore, because politicians cannot eliminate informational bias if 
information arises from a single interested group,
22 legislators will benefit from 
facilitating access to multiple interests, even from those whose desired policy outcomes 
are not aligned with their own (Austen Smith and Wright 1992, Epstein and O’Halloran 
1995, DeFigueiredo, Spiller and Urbiztondo 1999).  DeFigueiredo, Spiller and 
                                                 
18 The March 2006 students’ demonstrations in France represent one excellent example of transferring 
information to politicians about voters’ preferences concerning flexible labor policies. 
19 Such as participating in congressional hearings, directly lobbying agency staff, etc. 
20 Violent demonstrations is one example of informal illegal lobbying. 
21 See also Lupia and McCubbins (1994). 
22 Calvert (1985), DeFigueiredo, Spiller and Urbiztondo (1999). 
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Urbiztondo (1999), for example, show that under some conditions, open participation by 
multiple interest groups cancels out whatever information advantage each interest group 
may have vis-à-vis the politicians. 
II.3.2 Lobbying for Indirect Influence  
As it concerns lobbying for indirect influence, the information to be transmitted may be 
about constituents’ interests or about agencies or courts’ potential decisions.  The interest 
group transmits the information with the expectation that the agency or court, knowing 
that such lobbying is taking place, and that it will affect legislators’ reaction to the 
proposed decision, will adjust the proposed decision accordingly.   
Indeed, apart from the direct monetary advantages that legislators may obtain 
from interest groups participation,
23 legislators may value interest groups participation in 
the administrative process because of their informational advantage.  Since policy 
outcomes can also affect re-election probabilities, or more generally, a politician’s career 
advancement, legislators have incentives to provide interest groups with access both to 
the regulatory process, and to themselves.  This is the essence of the “fire alarm” theory 
of congressional oversight (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984), whereby congressional 
supervision is triggered by interest groups detection of bureaucratic “misbehavior.”
24   
Indeed, given that agency delegation is the natural consequence of increased policy 
complexity, legislators’ need to supervise the bureaucracy may be undertaken by 
                                                 
23 It can be argued that by allowing interest group participation in the administrative process, legislators 
may have increased their usefulness to interest groups, thus, increasing the amount interest groups will pay 
for access. See also Spiller (1990) for a revolving door theory of interest group influence where politicians 
benefit from interest group influence on bureaucratic decision making. 
24 McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (1987) view administrative procedures in that fashion.  In their view, 
administrative procedures guide bureaucracies to make decisions consistent with the preferences of the 
enacting coalition.   
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increasing the bureaucratic hierarchy.
25  Interest groups, though, have an important 
advantage over bureaucracies in gathering information (DeFigueiredo, Spiller and 
Urbiztondo, 1999).  Since interest groups’ constituents are directly impacted by policies, 
they are highly motivated to garner policy relevant information.  While supervising 
bureaucracies require budgets and have to be motivated to undertake the extra effort, 
interest groups’ research and monitoring activity is done for their own purpose, and does 
not require congressional funding, releasing congressional budgets for other purposes.  
This is the essence of the “fire alarm” strategy.  On the other hand, as mentioned above, 
interest groups are biased, while supervising bureaucracies may be less so.  As with direct 
lobbying, promoting multiple interest groups participation, including those in opposition 
to the politician, makes politicians strictly better off, as competing interest groups provide 
the greatest amount of information at the lowest cost to the elected official.   
DeFigueiredo, Spiller and Urbiztondo (1999) use this insight to explain the enactment of 
the Administrative Procedure Act by the US Congress in 1946.
26   
The Administrative Procedure Act,
 27 as well as most of the enabling legislation of 
regulatory agencies, set procedural requirements that provide for ample participation of 
interest groups in the regulatory process.  These procedural requirements stipulate that 
regulatory agencies must provide notice, must inform the public about proposed rule 
makings, must make their decisions taking into account the submissions of interested 
                                                 
25 The creation of a specific organ of the legislature whose purpose is to supervise the actions of the 
bureaucracy (such as the US General Accounting Office) is one such strategy.  The problem remains, 
though, of who monitors the monitor.  For a discussion of hierarchy as an organizational response to 
information problems, see Garicano (2000).   
26 McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (1987) present a slightly different view.  They see the organization of 
administrative procedures, in general and as applied to particular agencies, as ways to hard-wire and protect 
the interests of the enacting coalitions, while DeFigueiredo, Spiller and Urbiztondo (1999) focus more on 
the generic informational benefit to incumbent legislators. 
27 5 USC §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5372, 7521.  
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parties, and cannot rush nor make decisions in the dark.  In this setting, interest groups 
provide two important roles: first, they provide information to the regulatory agency 
about the state of the world, and second, they provide information to legislators’ about 
their constituents’ preferences.  Both are important for the agency and its political 
masters. On the one hand, agencies are resource constrained and hence information about 
the state of the world is always beneficial.  On the other hand, information about interest 
groups' preferences is important as it allows the agency to forecast potential political 
problems they may encounter at the legislature.  The procedural restrictions on decision 
making also provide the opportunity for interest groups to attempt to block agency 
decision making through lobbying their politicians - McCubbins and Schwartz’ (1984) 
“fire alarm” insight.  Interest group participation allows legislators to supervise the 
agency without having to be actively involved in the regulatory process, and hence limits 
the time that legislators have to expend in regulating regulators.
28  However, the 
information revealed through individual interest group’s lobbying activities, even if 
truthful, is naturally biased. Interest groups will not reveal information that will bring 
about a regulatory outcome that makes them worse off.  Thus, the APA’s widespread 
facilitation of interest group participation ameliorates the bias in information provided by 
each interest group.  
Transferring information about constituents’ interests also provides an indirect 
link between lobbying and policy decisions, whether by agencies or courts.  Under the 
Separation of Powers Hypothesis to judicial decision making, courts, understanding the 
                                                 
28 McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (1989) describe agency operations as an “autopilot” process.  By 
including interest group participation in agencies’ procedure and structure, agencies will change 
automatically in response to changes in the enfranchised interest groups’ preferences, freeing the legislators 
from the need to intervene. 
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play of the game following a judicial decision that can be overruled by legislative 
action,
29 would select policies only among those that are immune to legislative reversal.  
By changing legislators’ perceptions of their constituencies’ preferences, lobbying may 
change the set of judicial policies that are immune to legislative override.  Indeed, 
Iaryczower, Spiller and Tommasi (2006) find that interest groups lobby more when the 
courts are more constrained by the legislature.   
In sum, the reason why the literature looking for a connection between lobbying or 
campaign contributions and policy outcomes have failed to provide a direct connection 
between lobbying and campaign contributions and policy outcomes is that they may have 
essentially been looking at the wrong place.  As Iaryczower, Spiller and Tommasi (2006) 
emphasize, “the empirical work on the impact of lobbying has been looking at the wrong 
policy dimension.”  Rather than considering the impact on the nature of legislation, 
empirical research should focus on the way the administered state operates, that is, via 
bureaucracies and the courts.  In this sense, buying or lobbying for indirect influence 
ought to imply a stronger correlation between campaign contributions and lobbying to 
legislators and bureaucratic or judicial outcomes. 
II.4  Suing 
When buying and lobbying fail, the judicial process may still provide satisfaction.   
Litigation, however, can be used as a complement to buying and lobbying.  Indeed, 
because litigation is expensive, complex and time consuming, interest groups may use 
litigation as a threat to obtain policies advocated through their lobbying process.  The 
                                                 
29 For evidence on congressional override, see Eskridge (1991). 
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extent to which litigation threats can alter bureaucratic behavior, though, depends on the 
probability that the interest group is likely to win.  Thus, the composition of the 
legislature and that of the courts, impacts the credibility of litigation threats.  De 
Figueiredo (2005) finds, for example, that interest groups are most likely to challenge a 
Federal Communications Commission when the courts are more likely to rule against the 
administration.   
III.  Strategic Choice of Instruments 
Given the multiplicity of instruments of influence available to interest groups, we now 
analyze how interest groups may strategically select their choice.  Before a policy is 
implemented, interest groups face the choice of buying and/or lobbying.  Buying and 
lobbying are not equally efficient and effective for all groups.  Indeed, Hillman and Hitt 
(1999) propose that the current stage of an issue’s life cycle, the firm’s monetary and 
informational resources, and the corporate environment that the firm operates in 
determines the firm’s political strategies.  For example, Ansolabehere, Snyder and 
Tripathi (2002) find that unions and single-issue groups, whose objectives are more clear 
and partisan than other interest groups, tend to contribute rather than lobby.  Such 
patterns are consistent with theories of strategic interest group behavior.  More 
specifically, groups with large memberships can gain attention by their sheer number, and 
hence do not need to spend large amount of money buying legislators; groups with 
extreme ideological preferences may not reflect a large spectrum of legislative 
constituencies’ preferences, and may be better off engaging in direct or indirect buying 
(Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Tripathi 2002). 
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Once a policy has been implemented, litigation may be the only strategy left to 
the losing interest group.
30  The optimality of litigation will depend on the relative 
ideological position of courts, policymakers and the interest group.  Indeed, DeFigueiredo 
and DeFigueiredo (2002) show that lobbying falls with the probability that the court will 
reverse the agency.  De Figueiredo (2002) also finds that interest groups take the FCC 
more to courts when courts are ideologically far from the administration. 
III.1  A Model and Empirical Implications
31 
To highlight the strategic use of instruments, we develop here a simple model of 
separation of powers based on the model of indirect lobbying of Iaryczower, Spiller and 
Tommasi (2006).
32  There are two individual players, the court and the interest group,
33 
and a legislature populated by a continuum of legislators with total size one. The policy 
space is X = [0,1], and given ideal policy zi, player i has preferences over policies x∈X 
represented by a utility function  2 ) (
2
1
) , ( i i i z x z x u − − = . Without loss of generality, we 
assume that the interest group’s ideal policy is at the right extreme of the policy space, 
zu= 1, and refer to policy x’ as being pro-interest group with respect to x’’ whenever x’ > 
x’’.  
                                                 
30 Interest groups may intensify their lobby and buying activities with the purpose of reversing the policy 
by direct legislative override.  For this strategy to be “optimal”, though, the policy implementation must 
have reflected the erroneous strategic choice by the interest group. 
31 Much of this section is taken liberally from Iaryczower, Spiller and Tommasi (2006). 
32 DeFigueiredo and DeFigueiredo (2002) develop a similar vote buying rather than indirect lobbying 
model.  However, in their model there is no uncertainty, a fundamental issue to trigger informative 
lobbying. 
33 This model can also be applied to a game between the administration and the legislature.  Throughout 
this section, the word “court” can be replaced by the word “agency” to generate a model of indirect 
lobbying of the bureaucracy. 
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Legislators and the court differ in their responsiveness to voters.  In particular, we 
assume that the court is completely unresponsive to the position of voters in the policy 
space, and denote its preferred policy by zc∈ X.  We assume, though, that legislators are 
at least partially responsive to voters’ stance on the issue.  Assuming for simplicity that 
the distribution of voters in the policy space can be characterized by a single parameter θ 
∈ X, we let the ideal policy of legislator j be given by zLj(θ;βj)≡βj+θ, where for all j, βj 
>0 and βj < 1. The degree of conflict in the legislature is captured by the distribution of 
points βj among its members, which we describe by the cumulative distribution G(.);  i.e., 
for any point β, G(β) denotes the proportion of legislators for which βj ≤β. 
Given the extent of interest group activity, policy outcomes result from the 
interaction of the court and the legislature. While the precise form of this interaction 
depends on specific institutional details, in most polities the elective body can ultimately 
impose its will under some sufficiently demanding procedure. We represent this idea by 
assuming that the court chooses a ruling xc∈X, which the legislature can reverse with the 
votes of a majority m ∈ [1/2,1] of legislators. We say that a court’s ruling is “stable” in 
the legislature – and therefore final – if there exists no alternative policy that a majority m 
of legislators would prefer to it in a binary choice, and denote the set of stable rulings 
given the majority rule m by Sm.   
Legislators and the court are uninformed about the realization of θ, and have 
common prior beliefs represented by the cumulative distribution function F(⋅) with 
density f(⋅). In contrast, the interest group is perfectly informed about the realization of θ, 
and can potentially credibly transmit this information through costly actions - lobbying 
(participating in legislative or regulatory hearings, writing white papers, and even 
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organizing strikes and public demonstrations). In particular, given a realization θ’, the 
interest group can organize an observable level a of actions bearing a cost C(a,θ’). For 
simplicity we assume that C(a,θ)=a(k -θ), k>1, that is, the marginal cost of lobbying is 
decreasing in the pro-interest group stance of the population.   
The timing of the game can thus be described as follows: (i) θ is realized and 
privately observed by the interest group; (ii) the interest group decides a publicly 
observable level of lobbying intensity a; and (iii) the court chooses a ruling xc in the set 
of stable policies in the legislature Sm.
34  
An equilibrium is a triplet Γ={γ(⋅),xc(⋅),F(⋅|a)} consisting of (i) a strategy for the 
interest group, γ : X→R+, mapping “types” θ  to levels a of lobbying intensity a, (ii) a 
strategy for the court, xc : R+→ Sm, mapping observations of lobbying levels a to stable 
rulings xc∈Sm, and (iii) beliefs F( |a) by the court and the legislators such that:  









 ∀a∈R+, and 
(c) whenever a∈ γ(X), F(⋅|a) is determined from F(⋅) and γ(⋅) using Bayes’ rule.  
III.1.1  The Symmetric Information Benchmark 
We first characterize, as a benchmark, the symmetric information equilibrium. Note that 
in this case legislators are perfectly informed about the value of θ, and the interest group 
derives no benefit from lobbying, irrespective of the preferences of the electorate. Hence, 
                                                 
34 For completeness, there is a fourth stage in which the legislature reviews the court’s decision, 
but given that courts would only make policy choices that are stable, we can without any loss, 
discard this last stage. 
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there will be no lobbying in equilibrium. The relationship between preferences of the 
electorate and policy outcomes in the symmetric information environment, however, is 
the key element determining the amount and effectiveness of lobbying in the incomplete 
information environment.  
We start by characterizing the set of stable policies in the legislature given 
majority rule m. Letting  ≡  G
m
L β
-1(1-m) and    ≡ G
m
H β
-1(m), it is easy to see that 
Sm(θ)=[zL(θ;
m
L β  ), zL(θ; )]. That is,   is the critical legislator for a pro-interest group 
coalition, in the sense that any policy x to the left of her preferred policy would be 
replaced by a more pro-interest group policy. Similarly,   is the critical legislator for 
an anti-interest group coalition, in that any policy to the right of her preferred policy will 







L(m) ≤ βH(m), and βL(m) = 
βH(m) only with simple majority rule (m=1/2), in which case Sm(θ) collapses to the 
preferred policy of the median voter in the legislature, and the court has no policy making 
power. It follows that for m > 1/2, the set of possible court’s ideal policies that would be 
stable given θ  has positive measure.  
The court will then select its ideal policy unless it is constrained either for being 
“extremely” pro-interest group or anti-interest group in relation to the relevant players in 
the legislature.  In particular, since the preferred policy of every legislator is strictly 
increasing in θ, a higher value of θ  results in a pro-interest group shift of the entire set of 
stable policies. A court with a fixed policy preference zc may then become a “pro-interest 
group” court for a legislature observing a low realization θ’ (zc > zL(θ’;βH ) ), or an ”anti-
interest group” court for a legislature observing a high realization θ’’(zc < zL(θ’’;βL )). 
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Figure 1 depicts in bold the resulting court’s equilibrium rulings as a function of the state 
of nature, θ.  
Figure I  Court’s Best Response to Information 
 
The two parallel lines in the figure represent the preferences of the critical legislators as a 
function of the state of nature, zL(θ ; βL )=βL+θ  and zL(θ ; βH )= βH+θ . For each θ, the 
set of stable policies S(θ) is the segment between these lines, the interval [βL+θ, βH+θ] in 
the vertical axis. If, for some θ , the court’s ideal point zc is in S(θ), the court will be able 
to rule according to its preferred policy, facing no effective legislative constraints.  In the 
example depicted in the figure, this occurs for all states between the (interior) points θ0 
and  θ1. In this region, then, the flat portion of the bold line represents the court’s 
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equilibrium ruling. For θ < θ0, however, S(θ) is entirely below zc. Thus, if it were 
common knowledge among legislators that public sentiment is strongly anti-interest 
group, the ideal point of the court would not survive the challenge of a more anti-interest 
group legislation. The best choice for the court in such states is, therefore, to enact the 
most pro-interest group stable ruling; i.e., βH+θ.  For θ<θ0, then, the bold line 
representing the court’s equilibrium rulings coincides with βH+θ.  Similarly, for θ>θ1, 
S(θ) is entirely above zc.  In this subset of states the legislature is too pro-interest group 
compared to the court, and thus the best choice for the court in such states is to enact the 
most “anti-interest group” stable ruling; i.e., βL+θ. Proposition 1 below summarizes the 
preceding discussion.  
The legislature thus effectively constrains the court for some realizations of public 
opinion when the set  } : { 1 0 θ θ θ θ θ ≥ ∨ ≤ = K  is non-empty.  In other words, the court will 
be able to rule its preferred policy independently of public opinion only if this policy is 
both (i) pro-interest group relative to the preferences of the critical legislator for a pro-
interest group coalition before a pro-interest group electorate (zc > zL(1;βL )= βL+1) and 
(ii) anti-interest group relative to the preferences of the critical legislator for an anti-
interest group coalition before an anti-interest group electorate (zc < zL(0 ;βH )= βH ).  
Note that, as in Gely and Spiller (1990), this condition is more likely to be satisfied when 
there is significant dissent in the legislature (the critical legislators for a pro and anti-
interest group coalitions are far apart, βL<<βH).
35  
                                                 
35 See Proposition 1 in Iaryczower, Spiller and Tommasi (2006). 
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  Moreover, in general, the size of K increases with βL and decreases with βH. Thus, 
the set of realizations of public opinion for which the court is effectively constrained is 
always smaller the higher dissent in the legislature is.  Hence, the overall effect of 
legislators’ responsiveness to public opinion on judicial independence depends on the 
relative position of the court in the policy space.  
III.1.2  Informative Indirect Lobbying 
The previous analysis showed that when the court is constrained for some (publicly 
known) preferences of the electorate, an increase in θ  induces a more pro-interest group 
ruling, and thus, a more pro-interest group policy outcome in equilibrium. Iaryczower, 
Spiller and Tommasi (2006) show that when policy-makers are uncertain about the 
realization of θ, lobbying by the interest group restores the complete information 
mapping between the preferences of the electorate and policy outcomes. In particular, 
they show that equilibrium lobbying increases with the realization of θ when, given θ, the 
court is constrained by the legislature (i.e., θ∈K), and does not change when the court is 
unconstrained (θ∈ [θ0,θ1]).
36   
That is, in equilibrium the level of lobbying will reflect the preferences of the 
electorate up to the extent that this information can influence a binding constraint for the 
court (and thus policy outcomes). In other words, lobbying is effectively fully 
informative. As long as (informed) policy is responsive to the electorate’s preferences, 
interest group types facing different pro-interest group dispositions of the electorate will 
                                                 
36 See Proposition 2 and Lemma 1 in Iaryczower, Spiller and Tommasi (2006). 
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always choose different levels of lobbying, allowing the reproduction of the complete 
information link between policies and the preferences of the electorate.  
This does not imply, however, that the equilibrium will necessarily involve 
transmission of information. In fact, lobbying will be completely unresponsive to the 
preferences of the electorate if (and only if) the court is unconstrained for every possible 
realization of θ.  Conversely, there will be a complete separating equilibrium if (and only 
if) the court is constrained for every realization of public preferences. That is, only if the 
court’s ideal policy is “extremely anti-interest group” (i.e., zc < βL), or “extremely pro-
interest group” (i.e., zc > βH+1), interest groups will choose different lobbying level for 
different observed values of θ.  This result allows us to develop the response of the 
expected level of lobbying and pro-interest group rulings to changes in the composition 
of the legislature. Note that for our purposes changes in the composition of the legislature 
are relevant only to the extent that they affect the boundaries of the stable set of policies 
in the legislature, zL(θ;βL  )=βL+θ  and zL(θ;βH)=βH+θ.  Moreover, recall from the 
analysis of the symmetric information benchmark that the set of realizations of public 
opinion for which the court is effectively constrained decreases with the degree of dissent 
in the legislature. That is, in general, the size of K increases with βL and decreases with 
βH.  
Since the level of interest group lobbying is decreasing in the size of the 
constrained court ruling space, it is straightforward to see that a pro-interest group shift in 
the preferred policy of the critical legislator for a pro-interest group coalition βL (anti-
interest group coalition, βH) increases the expected pro-interest group tendency of the 
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court’ rulings level Eθ [xc], and increases (reduces) the expected level of lobbying, Eθ 
[γ].
37  
This result has direct implications to the response of equilibrium outcomes to 
changes in court’s preferences. First, the expected level of pro-interest group rulings will 
increase following a pro-interest group change in the court’s preferences unless the court 
is constrained for every realization of θ both preceding and following this change. The 
change in the expected level of lobbying is, however, ambiguous.
38  Similarly, we know 
from the analysis of the symmetric information benchmark that the effect of legislators’ 
responsiveness to public opinion on judicial decisions depends on the relative position of 
the court in the policy space. This implies that the relation between lobbying and the 
responsiveness of legislators to public opinion will also necessarily depend on the relative 
position of the court in the policy space. 
III.1.3  Empirical Implications 
This model has direct and empirically refutable implications for understanding 
interest groups’ lobbying strategies, as well as implications concerning the relation 
between policy outcomes and interest group activity. First, policy outcomes in the form 
of judicial decisions become more “pro-interest group” the higher the level of the interest 
group’s political activity. In other words, in this model, lobbying influences policies 
indirectly, via judicial adaptation.  Second, the expected level of lobbying decreases the 
more effective the separation of powers between the court and the legislature is (i.e., the 
                                                 
37 See Proposition 3 in Iaryczower, Spiller and Tommasi (2006). 
38 This should come as no surprise, however, since for this purpose, increasing xc with βL and βH given is 
qualitatively similar as simultaneously reducing both βL and βH taking xc as given, and from the prior 
discussion we know that βL and βH have opposite effects on the expected level of lobbying. 
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more divided the legislature is on the relevant issues). Specifically, the level of lobbying 
is decreasing in the magnitude of the set of stable policies in the legislature.
39  
This model also has strategic lobbying implications .  Consider Figure 1.  In the 
figure, for a given set of preferences zc, βH, βL, we can partition the set of realizations of 
the state of the world, θ, in three areas.  In regimes S1 and S3 (where the court is 
constrained either by a pro-interest group or anti-interest group legislature), informative 
lobbying takes place, while it does not in S2.  Regimes S1 and S3, however, differ in the 
individuals over which lobbying effort is being exercised.  While in S1,
40 the interest 
group lobbies a friendly legislator (i.e., that legislator with a higher pro-interest group 
tendency), in S2, the interest group is trying to mollify the preferences of the relatively 
anti  interest group legislator.  In other words, lobbying becomes counter-active.  In 
relatively bad states of the world, lobbying is focused on friendly legislators, while in 
relatively good states of the world, lobbying is focused on unfriendly ones.   
Finally, although in regime S2 lobbying becomes ineffective, suing is effective as 
legislators cannot agree in moving the administration policy in any direction.  Thus, we 
should observe litigation the more divided the legislature is on the interest group’s issue, 
and the stronger the division of powers in the polity, a result consistent with 
DeFigueiredo (2000) study of telecommunications litigation. 
                                                 
39 This model also has standard separation of powers empirical implications.  As in most separation of 
powers models, the equilibrium level of “pro-interest group” judicial decisions depends on the political 
composition of the legislature.  In equilibrium, a more “pro-interest group” legislature will trigger more 
“pro-interest group” decisions provided that the court is effectively constrained by the legislature. 
40 Recall S1 reflects cases when the state of the world is relatively anti interest group, as θ is relatively low, 
given the preferences of the polity. 
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IV. Interest Group Participation in Party Centered 
Systems
41 
The framework presented in the previous sections was based on an institutional 
environment resembling the separation of powers of the United States.  In the United 
States, members of the US Congress exhibit remarkable longevity; they also tend to 
specialize in committees and to play an active role in policymaking
42 and in overseeing 
the public bureaucracy.
43  Outside of the United States, though, legislatures most often do 
not resemble the US Congress in terms of many or all of these above-mentioned features.  
This is particularly the case in the party-centered systems (Shugart and Haggard 2001) 
that dominate the world’s democracies,
44 yet are also the least studied.
45  T h e  U S  
Congress is thus a rare outlier in the population of national legislatures.  As a 
consequence, theoretical models of interest group participation in the US, while very 
helpful in generating general theory, are also limited due to their status as case studies of 
an atypical case.  In this section we focus our analysis of interest group participation in 
party-centered systems that exist in a large majority of the world’s parliamentary and 
presidential democracies.
46  Legislatures, and policy making in general, in these countries 
                                                 
41 This section draws from Jones, Saiegh, Spiller and Tommasi (2002). 
42 On the longevity of US congressional careers see Polsby (1968) and Ornstein, Mann and Malbin (1998).  
On committee specialization and the US Congress’ policymaking role, see Shepsle (1978), Weingast and 
Moran (1983), Weingast and Marshall (1988), Krehbiel (1991) and Londregan and Snyder (1994). 
43 See Weingast and Moran (1983) and McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (1989). For a differing view on US 
Presidential powers see Moe and Howell (1999), while for a critical assessment of the “congressional 
dominance” theory see Moe (1987). 
44 By party centered we refer to those electoral systems that force the voters’ choices among parties rather 
than across candidates. See Carey and Shugart (1995). 
45 To the extent that studies of legislatures in other presidential democracies have been conducted, they tend 
to focus almost exclusively on the least party-centered systems; especially Brazil. 
46 The establishment of the European Union presents a unique case of an evolving institutional structure, 
from party centered to one better characterized as separation of powers.  For a discussion of how firms are 
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differ considerably from the US counterparts.  In party centered systems, legislators may 
not stay for long in the legislature. As a consequence, they may have little incentives to 
invest in specialized legislative skills, or to control the bureaucracy.  Similarly, in party-
centered systems, the focus of policy making tends to be away from the legislature – with 
the cabinet (as in the case of unified governments) or the government party taking a more 
fundamental policy making role.  In these instances, interest group participation in policy 
making drastically changes its nature.  We explore these issues here. 
In the previous sections we discussed how legislators benefited from interest 
group participation, and thus, how legislators have the incentive to mold the institutional 
framework in which they participate so as to extract as much information from it as 
possible.  We explore this incentive in alternative institutional environments here. 
The key question for comparative work is whether the assumptions that drive the 
US case are appropriate in understanding how electoral rules shape legislative incentives 
elsewhere.  In principle, non-US politicians are as strategic in their actions as their US 
counterparts.  However, the political institutions that shape legislators’ incentives do vary 
across countries; career structure, electoral laws, and party rules can be very different.  
The question narrows, then, to the incentives these politicians face in different contexts.
47   
For example, if party nomination is inconsequential for electoral success, as is the 
case for incumbents in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies (Ames 2001), party 
renomination will play no substantial role in shaping legislators’ behavior.  Thus, the US-
                                                                                                                                                 
adapting their political strategies to the emergence of powerful cross-national regulatory agencies, see Coen 
(1998). 
47 For a study of the impact of a country’s institutional features on legislators’ behavior, see Crisp et. al. 
(2004). 
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centered analytical framework may suffice.
48  In contrast, there are situations, as in 
closed-list PR systems, where nomination at the top of a major party list can virtually 
guarantee electoral success.  In this latter case, legislators’ behavior will be constrained 
by the renomination rules but essentially unconstrained by the electoral process (Strøm 
1997). 
In federal countries with a closed-list PR electoral system, the process by which 
the provincial (district) party lists are formed largely affects which candidates run on 
each party list, what order they occupy, and, consequently, their chances of winning a 
seat in Congress.  Hence, depending on the role that electoral rules give local party 
leaders in the creation of the district-party list, local party leaders may or not be key in 
the determination of legislators’ futures.  
In many countries, where local and national party bosses dominate the 
construction of the local party list, legislators’ ability to independently pursue a 
legislative career is substantially curtailed.  Indeed, from legislators’ perspectives, in 
order to pursue their desired career paths, they must maintain a good relationship with 
their local party bosses, not a good rapport with their constituencies.  In some 
circumstances, such a good rapport may hinder their political progression.  Party bosses 
have a complex political objective.  They want to maximize the performance of their 
party in their province and or nation, but at the same time want to safeguard their position 
within the provincial or national party structure.  The threat of challenge by popular 
legislators provides local and national party bosses with a strong incentive to reduce the 
                                                 
48 On the interaction between legislators and the President in Brazil, see Alston and Mueller (2006).  See, 
also, Samuels (2002) for an alternative explanation of the link between legislators and the executive in 
Brazil. 
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national and provincial visibility of their underlings by rotating them among the various 
jobs the party can offer.
49  Voters in these PR-based systems, tend to vote for the party 
list, not for the individuals on the list.   
Within this institutional context, legislators have little incentive to work hard to 
improve their visibility in the eyes of the voters, and no incentive to develop legislative 
policy expertise.  A legislator may be marginally aided in his/her career progression by 
obtaining public visibility.  However, policy expertise is unrelated to visibility, nor is it 
relevant for the candidate nomination and general election process.  The institutional 
barriers to reelection, therefore, generate widespread “shirking,” providing sub-optimal 
levels of effort both from an “informational” (Krehbiel 1991) and “institutional” (Fearon 
1999; Ferejohn 1999) perspective.  
Electoral incentives not only impact a legislature’s organization (Weingast and 
Marshall 1988), but also the design of bureaucratic decision making processes (Bambaci, 
Spiller and Tommasi 2002).  In party centered systems where electoral incentives are 
centralized around parties, information will follow the same extent of centralization.   
Baron (2000), for example, shows how interest group participation is less transparent – 
but not less active- in Japan than in the United States.  Although there are fewer access 
points, interest groups are able to provide information (lobby) in a systematic, albeit 
informal and centralized fashion.  In party centered systems, administrative procedures as 
the US APA have little purpose.  There is no need to inform legislators of the 
bureaucracy actions.  On the one hand, legislators in party-centered systems are not that 
interested in pursuing bureaucratic supervision.  On the other hand, in party centered 
                                                 
49 On the role of party bosses in Argentina, see Spiller and Tommasi (2003). 
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systems with unified governments – such as those in Japan or the UK – the bureaucracy 
is under substantial control from the cabinet, with the cabinet having little incentive in 
providing the legislature with substantial powers to supervise its own actions.   
The incentives for campaign contributions also change accordingly.  There is little 
incentive in widely distributing campaign contributions in party centered systems, as 
distributions to legislators may have little impact on their reelection, and their post-
reelection behavior will be highly impacted by the incentives of the political party bosses.  
Thus, as with lobbying efforts, campaign contributions will be highly centralized in key 
party decision makers.   
Finally, litigation in party centered systems may provide less satisfaction than in 
systems with stronger separation of powers.  Because party centered systems tend to 
narrow the separation between legislative and executive powers, courts face a 
substantially narrower set of discretion.  The courts are in a situation where  overturning 
the bureaucracy may imply alienating the cabinet, which may, in turn, trigger retribution.  
Indeed, evidence from Japan and the UK suggest that progression within the judiciary is 
dependent on proper behavior vis-à-vis the government of the day.
50  Similarly, 
Iaryczower, Spiller and Tommasi (2002) show that in Argentina, strongly unified 
governments tend to control the judiciary.
51   
                                                 
50 See Ramseyer and Rasmusen (1997) for evidence on Japan and Salzberg and Fenn (1999) for evidence 
on the UK.  
51 For a discussion of judicial adaptation to political control, see Spiller (1996a). 
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V. Conclusion 
In this survey we try to provide a framework to understand interest group participation in 
public policy decision-making.  We show that polities where legislatures have an 
important policy making role will tend to develop more transparent and direct interest 
group activity.  Polities where policy making is centralized in the cabinet or the 
government party, though, will tend to reserve interest group access to key decision 
making politicians.  The trade-off between campaign contributions, lobbying and 
litigation is also affected by the nature of the institutional environment.  Litigation loses 
its power in unified systems, limiting successful interest group activities to direct 
lobbying and buying.  In decentralized polities, the full extent of complementarities 
between direct and indirect lobbying, buying and suing become apparent. 
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